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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This is a Petition for Review of the Industrial Commission's 
August 3, 1992 Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for Review 
alleging entitlement to workers' compensation benefits sustained as 
a result of an industrial accident. A Petition for Review of that 
Order was timely filed with this Court on September 1, 1992. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this Petition for Review 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2) (1988), 35-
1-86 (1988), 63-46b-16 (1988), and 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1988); and Rule 
14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE(S)/STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
There are three substantial issues presented for review: 
(1) whether the Industrial Commission applied the wrong 
standard of proof to Petitionees injuries and did not properly 
shift the burden to the employer to find a line of work the 
Petitioner could do; 
(2) whether the Industrial Commission committed error in 
ignoring it's prior findings and decisions that at least 10% of 
Petitioner's whole body, permanent partial impairment was directly 
and exclusively attributable to the industrial accident; and, 
(3) whether the Industrial Commission improperly failed to 
award Petitioner permanent, total disability compensation due to 
Petitioner's injuries and inability to return to work which were 
occasioned by his 1975 industrial accident. 
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The standard of appellate review which is to be applied to the 
resolution of the above issues is one involving "correction of 
error", since they involve questions of law, and no deference to 
the agency's view of the law is required. Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-16(4) (d) 
(1988). Mor-Flo Industries v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d 328 (Utah 
1991). Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah 
State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE(S)/RULE(S) 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1975) is the 
determinative statute in this case. It is set forth in full in the 
Addendum thereto as Exhibit A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Zupon seeks review of the Industrial Commission Order 
denying his Motion for Review wherein he alleged entitlement to 
workers, compensation benefits occasioned by his industrial 
accident. 
Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Zupon filed an application for permanent, total disability 
compensation benefits sustained as the result of an industrial 
injury which occurred on or about August 7, 1975. (R. at 1) . 
Respondents alleged that Mr. Zupon failed to prove medical 
causation and is thus not entitled to permanent, total disability 
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benefits. (R. at 4, 21). A formal hearing was held before an 
Administrative Law Judge on February 6, 1992. (R. at 7). 
Disposition Below 
On May 24, 1991 Petitioner filed for permanent total 
disability benefits alleging that as the result of his August 7, 
1975 industrial injury he was no longer able to work. The 
Administrative Law Judge on March 18, 1992, found that there was no 
medical causal connection between the industrial accident and the 
Petitioner's total disability. His claim for permanent, total 
disability benefits was dismissed with prejudiced. (R. at 21-31, 
copy attached to Addendum as Exhibit B). 
Mr. Zupon filed a Motion for Review with the Industrial 
Commission which was subsequently denied on August 3, 1992. (R. at 
46-51, copy attached to Addendum as Exhibit C). He challenges that 
final agency action in this Petition for Review. 
Statement of the Facts 
On August 7, 1975, Mr. Zupon experienced an industrial injury 
to his lower back while employed by Kaiser Steel Corporation. (R. 
at 83) . At that time, Mr. Zupon was lifting an acetylene tank 
which was 5 feet long and 18 inches in diameter and weighed around 
200 pounds. As he started to lift the tank off the ground the tank 
was off to his side and thus he was twisting as he lifted the tank. 
(R. at 22). He immediately felt a sharp pain in his low back just 
below his belt line. (R. at 22). 
He was seen the day of the accident by Dr. S. Smoot at Carbon 
Medical Services Association, who continued to treat him until 
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November 13, 1975. (R. at 85, 100-110). He was also subsequently 
seen by Dr. Chapman, who on June 22, 1976 found that he was 
permanently disabled. (R. at 220). Mr. Zupon never returned to 
work after the industrial injury and he was awarded social security 
disability benefits beginning on January 1, 1977. (R. at 239). 
A Medical Panel was appointed which subsequently found that 
Mr. Zupon suffered from a 60% whole body permanent, partial 
impairment and that 10% of that impairment was due to the 1975 
industrial accident. (R. at 87-89). The Panel specifically agreed 
with Mr. Zupon's treating physician "... that the claimant cannot 
do mining or mechanic work," and further referenced his "... 
inability to work". (R. at 88). On February 10, 1977 the 
Industrial Commission awarded him permanent, partial impairment 
benefits based on the 10% related to the 1975 industrial accident 
only. (R. at 90-92). 
On May 24, 1991, Mr. Zupon filed a new claim for additional 
benefits, i.e., permanent, total disability benefits, alleging that 
as a result of his August 7, 1975 industrial injury he was no 
longer able to work. (R. at 1) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT(S) 
Mr. Zupon is entitled to have the benefit and presumption in 
the law as it existed at the time of his industrial injury. Under 
pre-1988 law, the employer had the burden of finding a line of 
employment which an employee could perform. The employer wholly 
failed to meet this burden in this case. 
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There was absolutely no evidence whatsoever to support the 
Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that Mr. Zupon's lumbar 
condition and his subsequent inability to work was the exclusive 
result of conditions which pre-dated his 1975 industrial accident. 
Rather the Medical Panel found that there was a 10%/50% 
industrial/pre-existing split of his substantial overall, whole 
body permanent, partial impairment, and there is uncontroverted 
evidence in the record of his total disability status as well. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT IS TO BE APPLIED LIBERALLY 
IN FAVOR OF AWARDING BENEFITS AND ALL DOUBTS AS TO 
COVERAGE ARE TO BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE INJURED 
WORKER. 
Few principles of workers' compensation law are as well 
established in this State as that workers7 compensation disability 
claims are to be liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits, 
and any doubts raised from the evidence are to be resolved in favor 
of the claim. Utah Courts have consistently reiterated this 
principle from 1919 to the present. Heaton v. Second Injury Fund. 
796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990); State Tax Commission v. Industrial 
Commission, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984); J & W Janitorial Co. 
v. Industrial Commission, 661 P.2d 949 (Utah 1983); Prows v. 
Industrial Commission, 610 P.2d 1362 (Utah 1980); McPhie v. 
Industrial Commission, 567 P. 2d 153, 155 (Utah 1977); Baker v. 
Industrial Commission, 405 P.2d 613 (Utah 1965); Askrew v. 
Industrial Commission, 391 P.2d 302 (Utah 1964); M & K Corp. v. 
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Industrial Commission. 189 P.2d 132 (Utah 1948); and Chandler v. 
Industrial Commission. 184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Chandler, supra at 1021-1022, 
discussed the proper construction of the Workers7 Compensation Act 
and the underlying purposes of the Act, and stated as follows: 
We are also reminded that our statute requires that 
the statues of this state are to be liberally construed 
with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to 
promote justice.' 
* * * * * * 
In this connection it must be remembered that the 
compensation provided for in the act is in no sense to be 
considered as damages for the injured employee or to his 
dependents in case death supervenes. The right to 
compensation arises out of the relation existing between 
employer and employee, and that the injury arises out of 
[or] in the course of the employment. Under such an act 
the costs and expenses of conducting the business or 
enterprise, including compensation for injuries to 
*employees or other casualties, must be taxed to the 
business. The theory of the Compensation Act is that the 
whole cost and expense of conducting the business as 
aforesaid is added to the cost of the articles that are 
produced and sold, and hence, in the long run, such costs 
and expenses are borne by the public; that is, by the 
consumers of the articles produced. The purpose of such 
an act, therefore, is to protect the employee and those 
dependent upon him, and in case of his serious injury or 
death to provide adequate means for the support of those 
dependent upon him. In view, therefore, that in case of 
total disability or death of the employee his dependents 
might become the objects of public charity, such a 
calamity is avoided by requiring the business or 
enterprise to provide for such dependents, with the right 
of the employer to add the amount that is paid out to the 
cost of producing and selling the product of such 
business or enterprise. The beneficent purpose of such 
acts are therefore apparent to all, and for that reason, 
if for no other. should receive a very liberal 
construction in favor of the injured employee. We are 
all united upon the proposition that in view of the 
purposes of such acts, in case there is any doubt 
respecting the right to compensation, such doubt should 
be resolved in favor of the employee or his dependents as 
the case may be. (Emphasis added). 
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The Administrative Law Judge in rendering her Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law failed to apply this vital rule of 
construction. Nowhere in her Findings or Conclusions is there any 
evidence of a "liberal construction" or the "resolution of doubt in 
favor of the claim". Whenever any doubt or uncertainty appears in 
the record, the Administrative Law Judge construed it against the 
injured worker. Her finding of a lack of medical causation, for 
the reasons set forth below, is simply not supported by the record. 
The "findings" and "conclusions" do not evidence "humane and 
beneficent purposes" as required by law. The entire underlying 
basis of her Order is thus flawed. This same defect carried over 
to the Industrial Commission's final agency action, and it is 
similarly flawed. The final Order should be reversed due to these 
conceptional flaws. 
II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FAILED TO SHIFT THE BURDEN TO 
THE EMPLOYER TO FIND A LINE OF WORK THE PETITIONER COULD 
DO. 
This case involves a claim for permanent total disability 
benefits related to an August 7, 1975 industrial back accident and 
thus pre-1988 law applies. The Administrative Law Judge in her 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order required Applicant 
to met a higher standard of proof than is found in the law. 
Mr. Zupon is entitled to the benefit of the law as it existed at 
the time of his injury, as stated in the Supreme Court decision of 
Marshall v. Industrial Commission, 704 P.2d 581 (Utah 1985). 
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Under pre-1988 law, the fact that the employee cannot go back 
to work at his usual line of employment shifts the burden of proof 
to the Employer to find a line of employment that the employee can 
in fact do or learn to do. It was never disputed that Mr. Zupon 
was unable to return to his usual line of employment, or that Mr. 
Zupon was trained to do something else, or could have done 
something else. In addition, the Medical Panel in its Findings of 
Fact Number 3, specifically noted "... this man's inability to 
return to work". (R. at 89). 
In this case, there was no testimony or evidence whatsoever 
indicating the Employer's willingness or efforts to attempt to 
employ Mr. Zupon in another line of work, nor was there any 
evidence of any attempt to retrain him in another job. The 
Employer thus failed to meet the shifted burden, the result of 
which must be an appropriate compensation award on remand. 
The Administrative Law Judge in her Order stated that "I found 
... that the applicant did not show that his lumbar problems alone 
prevented him from returning to his usual line of employment." 
(R. at 29) (Emphasis added). There is no such requirement in Utah 
workers compensation law and in fact the law is that a combination 
of industrial and non-industrial factors may result in a permanent, 
total disability award. To the extent that the Administrative Law 
Judge made such a finding, she further did so without reference or 
citation to the testimony or medical records. The evidence at the 
hearing, was directly contrary, i.e., that the Employer did not 
take Mr. Zupon back to work because of his back problem. Their 
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refusal to continue to employ him was based entirely on his lumbar 
condition and had little to do with his subsequent arthritis in his 
hands, or the difficulties he later developed in his upper 
extremities. 
As a result of Mr. Zupon's not being able to return to work, 
Respondents then had the burden to prove that Mr. Zupon was capable 
of performing, or being vocationally retrained to perform, 
substantial, gainful employment. Such evidence was neither argued 
nor supported by documentary or testimonial evidence of any kind 
whatsoever. The record does, however, show that Mr. Zupon made 
several unsuccessful attempts to return to work, and even contacted 
the Division of Rehabilitative Services of the Utah State Board of 
Education for their assistance, all of which unfortunately failed 
to produce any meaningful vocational results. 
In conclusion, the Utah Supreme Court ruling in Marshall, 
supra. instructs that once an injured worker is unable to return to 
his former employment - as in this case - the burden shifts to the 
employer to find work for the employee, or train the employee to 
learn to do some other line of work in which he could become 
substantially, gainfully employed. There is not evidence in this 
case that the Employer did anything to enhance Mr. Zupon7 s 
employment possibilities, and in fact, the uncontroverted evidence 
is to the effect that it simply declined to permit him to return to 
work as a coal miner, and took no further actions whatsoever to 
assist him in locating suitable employment. Therefore, the 
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Employer failed to meet its burden, and the entry of an appropriate 
permanent, total disability award is now required. 
Ill 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COMMITTED ERROR IN IGNORING 
IT'S PRIOR FINDINGS AND DECISIONS THAT AT LEAST 10% OF 
PETITIONERS WHOLE BODY, PERMANENT PARTIAL IMPAIRMENT WAS 
DIRECTLY AND EXCLUSIVELY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE INDUSTRIAL 
ACCIDENT, 
The Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that Mr. Zupon's 
lumbar condition is almost entirely the result of conditions that 
pre-existed his 1975 industrial accident is totally unsupported by 
anything in the record. The Medical Panel report found that there 
was a 10%/50% split of his rather substantial overall, whole body 
permanent, partial impairment with 10% due to the industrial 
accident and 50% due to pre-existing conditions. 
There was no evidence presented which indicated in any way 
that Mr. Zupon's inability to work was related to his asymptomatic 
degenerative arthritis in his back as distinguished from that 
portion that was directly attributable to his industrial accident. 
The Administrative Law Judge does not specifically refer to any 
evidence to back up that allegation and in fact none exists. The 
Industrial Commission's acceptance of that view - also without 
support - is similarly defective. 
There was no medical evidence offered at the hearing which 
would even slightly suggest that Petitioner's disability was not at 
least partially the result of the industrial accident, and the 
Respondents failed to offer any conflicting medical evidence. 
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Significantly, Mr. Zupon continued to work with his pre-existing 
problems and only ceased working at a very young age immediately 
after his 1975 industrial accident. The Industrial Commission 
cannot summarily ignore or arbitrarily discount competent, 
uncontradicted evidence without some rational basis for doing so. 
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission., 709 P.2d 1168 (Utah 
1985). Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Jacobs, 689 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1984). 
The actual Findings of Fact portion of the Order in this 
matter are grossly inadequate and do not meet recent legal 
requirements. No specific Findings are made, rather the 
Administrative Law Judge merely summarized, with editorial 
comments, the evidence presented. Such summary conclusions do not 
constitute proper fact-finding. The Industrial Commissions Order 
is similarly flawed. In the recent case of Adams v. Board of 
Review. 821 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1991), the Utah Court of Appeals 
stated, as follows: 
While the purported 'Findings of Fact' written by 
the A.L.J, contain an informative summary of the evidence 
presented, such a rehearsal of contradictory evidence 
does not constitute findings of fact. In order for a 
finding to truly constitute a 'finding of fact,' it must 
indicate what the A.L.J, determines in fact occurred.... 
The evidence did not merely indicate two possible 
versions of a fact whereby we could conclude that the 
denial of benefits necessarily indicates that the 
Commission accepted one version over another. The 
evidence shows several possible configurations and 
degrees of injury and/or disease, if any, and the causes, 
if any, thereby creating a matrix of possible factual 
findings. A mere summary of the conflicting evidence in 
this case therefore does not give a clear indication of 
the A.L.J.'s or the Commission's view as to what in fact 
occurred. Since we cannot even determine why the 
Commission found there was no causation shown, we clearly 
cannot assume that the Commission actually made any of 
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the possible subsidiary findings. The findings are 
therefore inadequate. Id. at 20. 
Although none of the parties, including the Administrative Law 
Judge, dispute the fact that Petitioner is presently permanently 
and totally disabled, neither the Administrative Law Judge nor the 
Industrial Commission support their conclusion that Mr. Zupon's 
permanent, total disability was not caused by the 1975 industrial 
injury. The Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission 
spend a great deal of time discussing Petitioner's prior medical 
problems, but do not make concise findings as to why Petitioner's 
permanent, total disability status is not related to his 1975 
industrial accident. That failure further manifests itself here in 
inadequate findings. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has recently informed this 
Commission that: 
In order for us to meaningfully review the findings of 
the Commission, the findings must be 'sufficiently 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose 
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each 
factual issue was reached.' Action v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 
996 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 
1336 (Utah 1979))...[T]he failure of an agency to make 
adequate findings of fact on material issues renders its 
findings 'arbitrary and capricious' unless the evidence 
is 'clear, uncontroverted and capable of only one 
conclusion.' Id. (quoting Kinkella v. Baucrh, 660 P.2d 
233, 236 (Utah 1983)). 
Nvrehn v. Industrial Commission, 800 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah App. 
1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). 
The Industrial Commission's as well as the Administrative Law 
Judge's purported Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
should at a minimum be vacated and remanded with instructions to 
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enter a new Order with detailed and subsidiary facts to disclose 
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion was reached. Failure to 
do so, denies Petitioner the ability to marshal the evidence in 
support of the findings and show that it is not substantial. Grace 
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67-68 (Utah App. 
1989) . If the Industrial Commission were required to do this, its 
result would probably be different since its denial of benefits is 
simply unsupportable. 
IV 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IMPROPERLY FAILED TO AWARD 
PETITIONER PERMANENT, TOTAL DISABILITY COMPENSATION DUE 
TO PETITIONERS INJURIES WHICH WERE OCCASIONED BY HIS 
1975 INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT, 
It is not disputed that the Mr. Zupon suffered from a pre-
existing impairment of 50% of the whole body that was attributable 
to matters present before his industrial accident occurred. Mr. 
Zupon has never been compensated for the pre-existing component of 
his industrial accident. 
Although it is truef as the Administrative Law Judge argues 
that the application for hearing did not indicated that a claim for 
additional impairment was being made, a claim was made for the 50% 
permanent, partial impairment at the hearing level. No adverse 
party raised the eight-year Statute of Limitation contained in the 
prior law. 
The Industrial Commission on Motion for Review for the first 
time, did not attempt to defend the rational of the Administrative 
Law Judge, but rather argued that under Utah Code Annotated, 
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Section 35-1-66 (1974) a claim for permanent, partial disability 
benefits must have been filed within eight (8) years of the date of 
injury, noting that Mr. Zupon filed his Application for Hearing 
some 16 years after the injury. The defense of the statute of 
limitations is an affirmative defense and was never raised by the 
Employer or the Uninsured Employers' Fund at the hearing level. As 
such, they were barred from asserting it then and are barred from 
asserting it now. 
It is appropriate that the Industrial Commission enter an 
appropriate award for the amount of Mr. Zupon's 50% pre-existing 
impairment. 
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
In conclusion, the parties readily acknowledge that Mr. Zupon 
is permanently and totally disabled, the only dispute appears to 
whether the evidence indicates that it was his pre-existing 
conditions rather than his industrial accident which precipitated 
that status. 
However, the uncontroverted evidence in this case reflects 
that Mr. Zupon worked a substantial portion of his life with his 
pre-existing conditions, and did not cease working until the 
occurrence of his industrial accident in 1975. As a result of that 
injury, the uncontroverted evidence further is, that Mr. Zupon was 
unable to return to his former work as an underground coal miner; 
that Kaiser Coal Corporation refused to rehire him or continue his 
employment for them in any capacity; that vocational rehabilitation 
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efforts made by the Division of Rehabilitation Services did not 
result in his being able to be retrained; and that after the 
occurrence of his industrial accident, he was forced into premature 
retirement at age 50 and was never able to return thereafter to 
substantial, gainful employment. 
Because of Mr. Zupon's significant overall whole body 
impairment equivalent to 60%, his age, his limited formal education 
which ended in the 11th grade, and the undisputed fact of his 
inability to return to work after the occurrence of the industrial 
injury, and his extensive work history which was essentially 
limited to heavy work in underground coal mine employment, the 
burden shifted to the Employer to find work for him, or retrain him 
to perform some work that he could do. The Employer utterly failed 
to respond to its obligation in this regard, which must result in 
reversal of the Industrial Commission's final agency action, and 
remand with instructions to enter an appropriate award granting 
permanent, total disability benefits to Mr. Zupon. 
And finally, Mr. Zupon is further entitled to an award for 50% 
whole body permanent, partial impairment compensation for that 
portion of his overall permanent, partial impairment attributable 
to conditions which preceded his industrial accident. The 
Employer's failure to timely raise the affirmative defense of the 
Statute of Limitations constitutes waiver with the result that the 
Industrial Commission's raising it as a bar for the first time 
following Mr. Zupon's filing of his Motion of Review of the 
Administrative Law Judge's Order is similarly untimely and 
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defective. An appropriate award should issue; however, the 
necessity for the entry of this additional award would be moot in 
the event Mr. Zupon is awarded permanent, total disability 
compensation since permanent, partial impairment would be merged in 
his life-time award. 
DATED this 23rd day of November/^1992. 
SNEY & DABNEYI, p.c. 
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EXHIBIT A: Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1975). 
EXHIBIT B; Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
(March 18, 1992). 
EXHIBIT C; Order Denying Motion for Review (August 3, 1992). 
35-1-67. Permanent total disability—Amount of payments—Vocational 
rehabilitation—Procedure and payments.—In cases of permanent total dis-
ability the employee shall receive 66%$ of his average weekly wages at 
the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less 
than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent wife and $5 for 
each dependent minor child under the age of eighteen years, up to a 
maximum of four such dependent minor children not to exceed the average 
weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not to exceed 
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week. 
However, in no case of permanent total disability shall the employer or 
its insurance carrier be required to pay such weekly compensation pay-
ments for more than 312 weeks; and provided further, that a finding by 
the commission of permanent total disability shall in all cases be tentative 
and not final until such time as the following proceedings have been had: 
Where the employee has tentatively been found to be permanently and 
totally disabled, it shall be mandatory that the industrial commission of 
Utah refer such employee to the division of vocational rehabilitation under 
the state board of education for rehabilitation training and it shall be the 
duty of the commission to order paid to such vocational rehabilitation 
division, out of that special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1), not 
to exceed $1,000 for use in the rehabilitation and training of such em-
ployee; the rehabilitation and training of such employee shall generally 
follow the practice applicable under section 35-1-69, and relating to the 
rehabilitation of employees having combined injuries. If and when the 
division of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education 
certifies to the industrial commission of Utah and m writing that such 
employee has fully co-operated with the division of vocational rehabilita-
tion in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division 
the employee may not be rehabilitated, then the commission shall order 
that there be paid to such employee weekly benefits at the rate of 66%% 
of his average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than 
a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the 
injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 
for a dependent wife and $5 for each dependent minor child under the 
age of eighteen years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor 
children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the 
time of the injury, but not to exceed 85% of the state average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury per week out of that special fund provided 
for by section 35-1-68 (1), for such period of time beginning with the 
time that the payments (as in this section provided) to be made by the 
employer or its insurance carrier terminate and ending with the death of 
the employee. No employee, however, shall be entitled to any such benefits 
if he fails or refuses to co-operate with the division of vocational rehabili-
tation as set forth herein. 
EXHIBIT A 
Commencing July 1, 1971, all persons who are permanently and totally 
disabled and on that date or prior thereto were receiving compensation 
benefits from the special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1) shall 
be paid compensation benefits at the rate of $60 per week. 
Commencing July 1, 1975, all persons who were permanently and totally 
disabled on or before March 5, 1949, and were receiving compensation 
benefits and continue to receive such benefits shall be paid compensation 
benefits from the special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1) at a rate 
sufficient to bring their weekly benefit to $60 when combined with employer 
or insurance carrier compensation payments. 
The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of 
the vocational training of the employee, certify to the industrial commis-
sion of Utah the work the employee is qualified to perform, and thereupon 
the commission shall, after notice to the employer and an opportunity to 
be heard, determine whether the employee has, notwithstanding such re-
habilitation, sustained a loss of bodily function. 
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both 
arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shall 
constitute total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to 
the provisions of this section and no tentative finding of permanent total 
disability shall be required in such instances; in all j6ther cases, however, 
and where there has been rehabilitation effected but where there is some 
loss of bodily function, the award shall be based upon partial permanent 
disability. 
Tn no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to 
pay compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as pro-
vided in sections 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this section, including loss of 
function, in excess of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time 
of the injury per week for 312 weeks. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 East 300 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on February 6, 1992 at 10:00 o'clock 
a.m. Said hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice of the 
Commission. 
BEFORE: Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The applicant was present and was represented by Virginius Dabney 
Attorney. 
The defendants, Kaiser Steel Corporation (Self-Insured) and/or 
Uninsured Employers Fund were not represented at the hearing. 
The Employers Reinsurance Fund was represented by Erie Boorman, 
Administrator. 
This case involves a claim for permanent total disability benefits 
related to an August 7, 1975 industrial back accident. In a stipulation filed 
with the Industrial Commission on the day of the hearing, the parties stipulated 
that if permanent total disability benefits were awarded, the self-insured 
employer had only a 1/6 proportionate share liability in such an award and that 
this share had already been paid as between the employer and the Uninsured 
Employers Fund. As a result of the stipulation, only the Employers Reinsurance 
Fund had potential liability and thus the only defendant at the February 6, 1992 
hearing was the Employers Reinsurance Fund. 
Pursuant to the stipulation, the Employers Reinsurance Fund stipulated 
to a 5/6 proportionate share of liability if permanent total disability benefits 
are awarded. However, the Employers Reinsurance Fund (ERF) argued at hearing 
that the applicant is not entitled to an award of permanent total disability 
benefits. ERF argues that the industrial injury at issue contributed very little 
to the applicant's overall disability and that the 10% whole man impairment that 
a prior medical panel awarded to the applicant, as related to the August 7, 1975 
industrial accident, is not well founded. Even if there is a 10% whole man 
impairment related to the August 7, 1975 industrial accident, ERF argues that 
that small amount, compared with the 50% whole man impairment that was found to 
be related to pre-existing ankylosing spondylitis, was a minor contribution to 
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the applicant's significant existing disability. ERF cites two cases which deal 
with injured employees whose permanent disabilities were found to have been 
caused by problems unrelated to the relatively minor compensable industrial 
injury involved. Hodges v. Western Piling & Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d 713 (Utah 
1986), Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah App. 1988). ERF also 
argues that it was the advancement of the arthritis to the applicant's hands and 
fingers, which occurred sometime after the industrial accident and was unrelated 
to the industrial accident, which caused the applicant to become truly disabled. 
ERF points to the Social Security Disability records as support for this 
argument. 
In a letter to the Employers Reinsurance Fund, dated February 5, 1992, 
the applicant's attorney summarized the basis for the applicant's claim of 
permanent total disability related to the August 7, 1975 industrial accident. 
In referring to the causal connection between the industrial accident and the 
permanent total disability, that letter indicates that the applicant relies 
primarily on: 1) the failure to return to work after the August 7, 1975 
industrial accident and 2) the award of Social Security Disiability beginning 
January 1, 1977 with a primary diagnosis of ankylosis of the lumbar spine. The 
letter states: 
The Decision df the Social Security Administration, 
Administrative Law Judge confirms that when the lumbar problem 
extended into Mr. Zupon's extremities causing him to lose hand 
and finger dexterity, he then became totally disabled. ... 
Please also note that Mr. Zupon never had any problems with 
his arms, hands or fingers prior to the industrial accident, 
and that problems with regard to his extermitites were 
subsequent to that event. 
Based on the explanation above, the ALJ understands that the applicant claims 
that his hand and finger problmes are somehow related to the lumbar problem. 
After the hearing, the ALJ took the matter under advisement so that she 
could review the medical records submitted at hearing (Exhibit A-l). The matter 
was considered ready for order as soon as the records were reviewed. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant is a male who was 51 years old on the date of injury and 
who is currently 67 years old. The applicant's compensation rate has been set 
by prior Commission order at $155.00 per week (Exhibit E). At the time of the 
applicant's industrial injury, on August 7, 1975, the applicant was employed by 
Kaiser Coal Corporation in Sunnyside, Utah. He was working in mine #3 when he 
was injured. The applicant's duties at the mine included maintenance and repair 
of mechanical and electrical equipment and he was also the fireboss. On the date 
of injury, the applicant was lifting an acetylene tank which he described as 
being 5 feet long and 18 inches in diameter. The applicant estimated that the 
tank weighed around 200 pounds. As he started to lift the tank off the ground, 
the applicant's weight was not under the tank. The tank was off to the side of 
him and thus he was twisting as he lifted the tank. The applicant stated that 
he felt a sharp pain in his low back just below the beltline as he attempted to 
lift the tank. The applicant stated that he could hardly walk after that. 
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The applicant was seen the same day by Dr. S. Smoot at Carbon Medical 
Services Association in Dragerton, Utah. Dr. Smoot's medical report for that day 
indicates that X-rays were t,aken of the lumbar spine. The X-ray report indicates 
that the film was read to show extensive degenerative changes and early spur 
formation. Dr. Smoot decided to treat the applicant conservatively and he had 
the applicant return approximately a week later (the date on the office note is 
not legible). Per the office note for this follow-up visit, Dr. Smoot noted that 
the applicant had aches and pains all over his body at that time. Dr. Smoot 
noted that this was probably a generalized arthritic reaction. He prescribed 
some wygesic and butazolidine. On August 27, 1975, Dr. Smoot again saw the 
applicant and he noted that the applicant was feeling somewhat better, but that 
his generalized discomforts continued. He continued the applicant on the same 
medication. The September 3, 1975 office note indicates that the applicant was 
still complaining of pain in the back and shoulders and "all over." Dr. Smoot 
changed the applicant's medication and a week later he noted that the applicant 
was still having some pain inthe mid-thoracic and lumbar area. On September 17, 
1975, Dr. Smoot noted that the applicant's complaints remained the same and he 
gave the applicant instructions for exercises. In follow-up on September 24, 
1975, Dr. Smoot noted that the exercises had made the applicant feel worse and 
that at that time he even had pain in his ears. At the applicant's request, Dr. 
Smoot provided the applicant with additional pain medication. 
On October 1, 1975, Dr. Smoot saw the applicant again and he noted that 
the pain was worse in the shoulder. He re-X-rayed the lumbar spine and again 
noted only the degenerative changes. He indicated that the applicant would 
probably need an orthopedic consultation. This was not scheduled until later in 
the month and thus Dr. Smoot saw the applicant twice more. On October 7, 1975 
Dr. Smoot noted that the applicant had aches in all his joints. Dr. Smoot's 
office note for that date also indicates that the applicant had been talking to 
his brother-in-law who worked for Social Security. As a result, the applicant 
asked Dr. Smoot about being "totaled out." On that same day, the applicant filed 
his initial application for Social Security Disability benefits. The applicant 
saw Dr. Smoot one more time on October 15, 1975 and Dr. Smoot's note for that 
date indicates only that the applicant was feeling worse and that he was to see 
a Dr. E. Chapman on October 20, 1975 for an orthopedic consultation. 
Dr. Chapman's October 20, 1975 office note indicates that the 
applicant's treatment to that point had been limited to rest and medication. He 
noted that the applicant was having continued pain in the mid and lower spine 
with radiation to the hips (left greater than right), with neck pains and right 
arm pain. Dr. Chapman read X-rays of the dorsal spine, the lumbar spine and the 
pelvis to show arthritic spurring. His assessment was that the applicant was 
experiencing the residuals of an acute strain of the lower lumbar spine. He 
prescribed a book on back care, a Taylor back brace, a cervical pillow and he 
recommended that the applicant rest frequently and put a board under his 
mattress. When Dr. Chapman saw him again on October 24, 1975, he noted that the 
applicant had improved and had "taken to" the Taylor brace. Dr. Chapman's office 
note states that the applicant still had back pain and was quite certain that he 
could not return to his regular job at Kaiser. However, Dr. Chapman noted that 
the applicant was a master electrician and would be able to do other electrical 
work that was compatible with his limitations. Nonetheless, he did not release 
the applicant to return to work at that time. 
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When Dr. Chapman saw tne applicant again on November 13, 1975, he noted 
that the applicant had experienced a recurrence of pain when he tried to be more 
active. He noted that the applicant's side talent as an electrician would not 
be helpful to him since it , involved activities such as crawling in attics and 
pulling on conduit. He precribed darvon for the applicant and indicated he did 
not need to return for another 3 months, at which time he would be rated. He 
again indicated that the applicant was unable to return to work at that time. 
The next medical treatment noted in the medical records was an admit to 
Castleview Hospital from January 8, 1976 to January 13, 1976 for a 
hemorrhoidectomy. The applicant saw Dr. Chapman again on February 2, 1976 and 
Dr. Chapman noted that the applicant was progressively getting worse with pain 
throughout his lumbar spine and pain in the elbows and shoulders. Dr. Chapman 
was of the opinion that surgery would not be helpful. He opined that the 
applicant would not be able to retrun to work as a miner and he determined that 
the applicant had a 50% loss of body function as a result of the industrial 
injury. This apparently was some kind of a rough estimate and was not an 
impairment rating, because in the same office note, Dr. Chapman indicates that 
he would not assign a disability rating due to the complicated nature of the 
disability. He recommended that the applicant obtain a rating from an Industrial 
Commission medical panel. ^ When Dr. Chapman completed his "final bill" for the 
carrier, on February 19, 1976, he indicated on it that the applicant was still 
unable to return to work. He noted that the applicant had a severe residual 
disability and that it was difficult to separate the possible pre-existing 
problem from the industrial portion. He again noted on this billing that the 
applicant should be seen by an Industrial Commission medical panel to be rated. 
The applicant apparently did file an application for hearing with the 
Industrial Commission sometime after his February visit with Dr. Chapman. While 
the application was being processed and the matter was being set for hearing, the 
applicant again returned to Dr. Chapman on June 22, 1976. On this visit, the 
applicant complained of pain in the shoulders, elbows and hands. Per Dr. 
Chapman's office note, this had been present prior to the date of injury for 6 
or 7 years, but had gradually become worse and quite severe within the last year. 
Dr. Chapman did shoulder X-rays and found these to be negative, but elbow and 
hand X-rays were read to show arthritic narrowing and spurring. After reviewing 
the X-rays, Dr. Chapman listed the applicant's diagnoses as: 1) progressive 
arthritis of the spine, shoulders, elbows and hands and 2) possible entrapment 
of flexor tendon, middle finger, right hand. Dr. Chapman concluded that the 
applicant was permanently disabled for his regular occupation in the coal mine 
due to progressive generalized arthritis. This was the applicant's last visit 
with Dr. Chapman. 
On August 23, 1976, the applicant attended a hearing at the Industrial 
Commission. The ALJ who heard that case referred the matter to a medical panel. 
Thereafter, the applicant saw Dr. A. MacArthur, presumably an orthopedic 
physician, on September 28, 1976. Dr. MacArthur's records are found in the 
medical record exhibit under the tab for Dr. Chapman's records. Dr. Chapman is 
associated with the Central Utah Orthopedic Clinic in Provo, Utah and it may be 
that Dr. MacArthur is also associated with that clinic. That information is not 
in the medical record exhibit. Another possibility is that Dr. MacArthur has a 
separate practice and Dr. Chapman referred the applicant there for a second 
opinion. At any rate, Dr. MacArthur's analysis of the applicant's condition is 
quite differenct from that of Dr. Chapman. Dr. MacArthur noted that the 
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applicant's chief complaint was back pain subsequent to an acute lumbar strain 
from which the applicant did not improve. He noted that the applicant was 
experiencing constant pain and stiffness, but no leg pain. Per Dr. MacArthur's 
office note, the applicant's symptoms were aggravated by any activity and the 
applicant felt he was getting worse. Dr. MacArthur's office note indicates that 
there was no numbness or weakness, no abnormal gait or stance, no spinous process 
tenderness, no sensory or motor defecits, and no spasm. He noted that the 
applicant had been under no active treatment program. He concluded that he did 
not bjelieve that the applicant had back pain significant enough to keep him from 
working. He recommended return to work unless something could be detected by way 
of radiological studies. When Dr. MacArthur reviewed films on October 5r 1976, 
he noted that the X-rays showed only very minimal arthritic changes and nothing 
he could put together with the applicant's history and physical which would cause 
the applicant to be unable to return to work or to be restricted in his work. 
On November 24, 1976, the Industrial Commission medical panel issued its 
report (Tab D, Exhibit A-l). The medical panel read the applicant's X-rays to 
show sacroiliac sclerosis and arthritic changes along the entire lumbar spine 
consistent with the clinical impression of ankylosing spondylitis. The panel 
concluded that the applicant was physically capable of doing light work but was 
unable to do mining or mechanical work. The panel rated the applicant as having 
a 60% whole person permanent impairment (without taking into consideration his 
loss of eyesight in the left eye) and the panel attributed 10% of that impairment 
to the industrial injury because there was "a one-in-six chance that the 
ankylosing spondylitis was aggravated by the lumbar back strain on the basis of 
the progression of the X-ray changes, and this man's inability to return to 
work." The panel concluded that there was no need for future medical care 
related to the August 7, 1975 industrial accident. On February 10, 1977, the 
prior ALJ in this matter issued a on order awarding the applicant permanent 
impairment benefits based on the 10% whole person impairment rated by the panel 
as being related to the industrial accident. 
While the matter was under adjudication at the Industrial Commission, 
the applicant was going through the process of applying for Social Security 
Disability benefits (see Tab L, Exhibit A-l generally). The applicant's initial 
application was denied and the applicant applied for a hearing that was held on 
June 15, 1976. After the hearing, the applicant was again denied in a decision 
issued on November 19, 1976. This decision was affirmed on appeal to the Appeals 
Council on January 18, 1977, but the matter was reopened in late 1977 as will be 
noted to follow. 
In April of 1977, the applicant was apparently rerated by the VA with 
respect to his impairment or disability. There is a medical record indicating 
that the rating was apportioned as follows: 40% anklosing spondylitis, 30% left 
eye, and 10% right elbow, for a combined rating of 60%. The ALJ is not real sure 
how these military ratings are determined, but understands that the rating system 
is not consistent with the system specified in the AMA Guides to the Evaluation 
of Permanent Impairment. 
In December of 1977, the applicant filed unspecified "new evidence" with 
Social Security that resulted in the U.S. District Court remanding the matter to 
Social Security for consideration of the new evidence. A supplemental hearing 
was conducted on May 31, 1978 and the decision to award benefits was issued on 
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July 11, 1978. That decision (found under Tab L, Exhibit A-l, pp. 157-161) notes 
that the applicant's arthritis in his hands became much worse starting in January 
of 1977. In contrast, the applicant actually noted some improvement in his back 
pain as a result of losing 30 pounds between January and May 1978 (Exhibit A-l, 
p. 158). The decision goes on to note that the industrial injury most likely had 
only a minimal effect on the applicant's disability and notes that the applicant 
was net considered disabled until the arthritis in the hands and fingers became 
acute in January 1977. The decision states: 
Assuming that the medical panel was correct, his percentage of 
disability was increased only 10% by the industrial accident. 
It does not appear the additional impairment resulting from 
the back strain would be sufficient to preclude claimant from 
all substantial work. However, the claimant maintains that in 
addition he has lost hand and finger dexterity. .. . The 
administrative law judge is impressed with the sincerity of 
the claimant when he testified that beginning in January 1977 
he lost the dexterity of in his hands. Until that time the 
claimant is not deemed to have been disabled but considering 
the credibility of the claimant's testimony as to the effect 
of arthritis in his hands and fingers together with his other 
impairments, it is found that he claimant became disabled 
January 1, 1977 which disability has been continuing. 
(Exhibit A-l, pp. 160-161). The Social Security ALJ noted that prior to the 
problems with the hands, the vocational expert indicated that the applicant was 
capable of performing light electrical work. 
There are no medical records in the medical record exhibit (Exhibit A-l) 
indicating any actual treatment for back pain or lumbar problems after 1976. In 
December of 1981, the applicant was reevaluated by Dr. C. Bench, apparently to 
determine whether Social Security Disability benefits would continue at that 
point. Dr. Bench's report is located at Tab L, Exhibit A-l(pp. 164-165). After 
examination his impression was: 1) history of low back pain and low back injury, 
rule out ankylosing spondylitis, 2) rule out rheumatoid arthritis, 3) cervical 
spondylosis with headaches, 4) traumatic injury left eye, rendered blind, 5) 
chronic sinusitis and 6) obesity. In an addendum report, Dr. Bench noted that 
the rheumatoid factor tests were negative and he revised his impressions as 
follows: 1) early cervical spondylosis with early degenerative disk disease of 
C5-6, 2) low back pain secondary to degenerative disk disease L5-S1 moderate in 
severity, 3) pain in the right shoulder secondary to some right sub-acromial 
bursitis and degenerative arthritis of the right AC joint, to a minimal degree. 
His comment was: "I think this patient's symptoms are way out of proportion to 
the objective findings which are presented." 
From February 10, 1983 through May 25, 1983, the applicant was an 
inpatient in Castleview Hospital and the University of Utah Hospital with 
extensive intestinal problems and several surgeries. The applicant had 
postoperative septicemia and renal failure with gastrointestinal bleeding and it 
was necessary for him to be monitored in the intensive care unit for several 
weeks. It is unclear what if any impairment resulted due to this extended 
intensive treatment and surgery. In May and June of 1988, the applicant 
apparently underwent cardiac evaluation as noted by the Holter Monitor tests done 
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at the Salt Lake Clinic. Those records are somewhat unclear with respect to what 
conclusions were made as a result of the tests. 
With respect to pre-existing conditions, the applicant sustained a 
perforating wound to his left cornea while working in a mine in October of 1954. 
There are a couple medical records from this incident under Tab H in the medical 
record exhibit. The applicant testified at hearing that he was hit in the left 
wrist, by a pitched ball when playing baseball in 1941, but there are no medial 
records from this incident and the applicant indicated that he had had no 
problems with the wrist subsequent to 1941. He stated that he had no breathing 
problems resulting from his years of work in the mines. 
The applicant completed the 11th grade in highschool. The applicant's 
work history includes working for the railroad for 2 years, some electrical work 
and training in the service for 4 years and thereafter in underground mines (from 
1946 through 1975). The applicant indicated that while he was employed working 
in the mines he also did some electrical contracting and furnace installation on 
the side. The applicant stated that after his back injury in 1975, he tried to 
get work as a fireboss again but was denied jobs because he could not pass the 
physical. His wife testified that the applicant did try to find work, but the 
X-rays of his back always prevented him from passing the physicals. 
The applicant was paid 25 weeks of temporary total compensation by the 
employer from August of 1976 to February of 1976. In February of 1976, he began 
receiving union disability pension benefits (amount unspecified) and he 
apparently continues to receive this along with his social security benefits 
(amount also unspecified). In February of 1977, he began receiving non-service 
connected VA disability benefits ($200.00 per month). 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The ALJ finds that the applicant has failed to sustain his burden of 
proof in establishing a medical causal connection between his permanent inability 
to work and the August 7, 1975 industrial injury. The ALJ finds that there are 
two main reasons why the evidence does not support the requisite causal 
connection. First, the evidence shows that it was the arthritic condition in the 
hands and fingers that truly caused the applicant to be unable to work, not the 
ankylosing spondylitis in the lumbar spine. Second, even if one were to presume 
that the ankylosing spondylitis was causing the applicant to be disabled, the 
industrial injury did not cause the ankylosing spondylitis and only questionably 
aggravated it. 
A. The Cause of the Inability to Work: 
The July 11, 1978 Social Security Disability (SSD) decision makes it 
very clear that Social Security found that the applicant became unable to perform 
gainful employment when the arthritis in his hands and fingers became severe in 
January 1977, and not before that. The applicant was denied Social Security 
Disability benefits in a series of decisions prior to when SSD gave consideration 
to the onset of arthritis in the extremities. Therefore, Social Security found 
that the applicant's lumbar problems, even with the aggravation that may have 
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been caused by the industrial back injury, was not a sufficient disabling 
condition to cause him to be unable to perform any gainful work. The vocational 
expert who testified at the May 1978 SSD hearing indicated that there were jobs 
in the region where the applicant lived that he could have performed in 1978 
(after the industrial injury) if he had not lost the dexterity in his hands and 
fingers. The July 11, 1978 Social Security decision re-emphasizes this in very 
plain terms. Although this ALJ is not bound in any way by the findings of the 
Social Security Administration, this ALJ finds the SSD decision very relevant and 
convincing. It is convincing because other evidence presented to this ALJ, to 
be discussed below, is consistent with the SSD determination that it was the 
arthritis in the hands that caused the applicant to be totally disabled, and not 
the anklosing spondylitis in the lumbar spine, which caused the applicant to be 
only partially disabled (unable to perform the demanding work in the mines and 
as a building construction electrician). 
The applicant has argued that the arthritis in the hands and fingers is 
somehow related or was somehow caused by the lumbar condition. The February 5, 
1992 letter to the Administrator of the Employers Reinsurance Fund, noted at the 
beginning of this Order, refers to when the "lumbar problem extended into Mr. 
Zupon's extremities." Unfortunately, there is no medical evidence at all which 
even suggests that the lumbar condition and the condition in the hands and 
fingers is somehow related. The applicant has pointed out that he had no 
problems in his hands until after the industrial accident, but there needs to be 
more than just a sequential finding to say that the lumbar back strain on August 
7, 1975 caused the progressive degenerative arthritis in the hands and fingers. 
In addition, the applicant's argument is this regard is not clearly supported by 
the medical records. Dr. Chapman noted that the applicant had been having 
problems with his hands and fingers for 6 or 7 years prior to the date of injury 
and that it became more severe in 1977. It is the applicant's burden to present 
supportive medical evidence for his theories on the medical causal connection 
between the work injury and the disabling condition. In arguing that the 
arthritis in the extremities is related to the back strain, the ALJ finds that 
the applicant has failed to sustain this burden. 
B. The Contribution of the Industrial Injury? 
Although the ALJ finds that the analysis under A. above is sufficient 
to sustain a finding that permanent total disability benefits are not payable, 
the ALJ feels it is appropriate to also discuss the limited role the industrial 
injury played in the applicant's overall disability. The applicant has 
emphasized that he did not return to work after the industrial injury and has 
pointed out that a prior medical panel found that the industrial injury 
permanently aggravated his pre-existing ankylosing spondylitis. However, the 
medical evidence presented for this adjudication leaves the ALJ with some 
question regarding why the applicant did not return to work after the industrial 
injury and leaves the ALJ with some real questions regarding the prior medical 
panel's finding that the applicant sustained a 10% whole person impairment as a 
result of the industrial injury. 
After the industrial back strain on August 7, 1975, the applicant 
received only conservative care for his back for several months. No acute injury 
to the spine was ever diagnosed radiologically. Surgery was never recommended 
or performed. There are no medical records regarding treatment for the back from 
1976 forward. The 1976 medical panel concluded that the applicant would need no 
ORDER 
RE: JOHN ZUPON 
PAGE 9 
future treatment for the'back related to the industrial injury. The office notes 
of the doctors that treated the applicant just after the industrial .injury (Dr. 
Smoot and Dr. Chapman) include regular mention of pain or limited use in many 
areas of the body besides the lumbar spine. The shoulders, the mid-thoracic 
spine, the hips, the neck and the elbows are all mentioned. Dr. Smoot noted 
aches in "all joints" at one point and even mentions ear pain. The medical 
evidence seems to suggest that the applicant was experiencing symptoms related 
to what Dr. Chapman diagnosed as "progressive arthritis of the spine, shoulders, 
elbows and hands." Dr. MacArthur concluded in September 1976 that the 
applicant's back pain was not so severe as to prevent him from working and Dr. 
MacArthur went so far as to state that the applicant needed no work restrictions. 
As late as 1981, when the applicant was re-evaluated for SSD by Dr. Bench, the 
medical conclusion was that the applicant's symptoms greatly exceeded any 
objective findings. 
In spite of the above findings, this ALJ would probably have done what 
the previous Industrial Commission ALJ did and would have given the applicant the 
benefit of the doubt by awarding the 10% whole person impairment that the medical 
panel attributed to the industrial injury. However, this would have been giving 
the applicant the extreme benefit of the doubt. This ALJ has never seen a 
medical panel finding of impairment that is based on a 1 in 6 chance that there 
might have been an aggravation. The ALJ recognizes that there is some doubt in 
any medical conclusion, but the ALJ has always been of the impression that there 
should be a greater than 50% chance before the medical experts can say something 
probably caused something else. If it is less than 50%, or a lot less as in this 
case, then the ALJ would think that the panel would have to say it is NOT more 
likely than not that the connection exists. 
Notwithstanding the highly questionable analysis of the prior panel, 
even if one concedes that the industrial injury caused 10% whole person 
impairment, this is still a very minimal portion of the applicant's overall 
disability or impairment. If not for the causation problems discussed above, the 
ALJ might find that the 1/6 contribution was sufficient to support a finding that 
the industrial injury caused the total disability. However, considering all the 
other evidence, the ALJ must conclude that there is insufficient supportive 
evidence to find that the industrial injury caused the applicant's total 
disability. As such, the applicant's claim for permanent total disability 
benefits related to the August 7, 1975 industrial injury must be dismissed. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's claim for permanent total 
disability benefits related to the August 7, 1975 industrial accident is 
dismissed for failure to establish a medical causal connection between the 
industrial accident and the applicant's total disability. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing shall 
be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, specifying in 
detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so filed, this Order 
shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
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The Industrial Commission of Utah reviews the Motion for 
Review of respondent in the above captioned matter, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63-46b-12. 
The applicant filed a claim for permanent total disability 
benefits related to in industrial injury on August 7, 1975. A 
hearing was held on February 6, 1992. In her decision of March 18, 
1992, the administrative law judge (ALJ) denied the applicant's 
claim. The applicant timely filed this motion for review and was 
granted additional time to submit a memorandum in support of his 
motion. The applicant submitted a memorandum two months after the 
time had expired for submission of his memorandum. 
1. DID THE ALJ APPLY THE WRONG STANDARD OF PROOF? 
The applicant asserts that he was prejudiced by the ALJ's use 
of a "higher standard of proof than is found in the law." It is 
unclear what "higher standard" the applicant believes was used 
here, but examination of the record indicates that the ALJ 
correctly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard to the 
issue of medical causation. See Allen v.Industrial Commission, 
729 P.2d 15, 23 (Utah 1986). The ALJ found that the applicant 
failed to establish medical causation by a preponderance of the 
evidence and denied the applicant's claim for permanent total 
disability. 
The ALJ relied on Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954 
(Ct. App. 1988) which held that a showing of medical causation was 
required under Allen. U.C.A. 35-1-69 was construed to require a 
showing of medical and legal causation to support an award for 
permanent total compensation. Id. 
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2. DID THE ALJV IMPROPERLY ANALYZE THE CLAIM AS ONE 
BASED ON LUMBAR PROBLEMS IN CONJUNCTION WITH 
ARTHRITIC DISABILITY IN THE HANDS AND FINGERS? 
Utah Code Annotated 35-1-69 provided that: 
If any employee who has previously incurred a permanent 
incapacity by accidental injury, disease, or congenital 
causes, sustains an industrial injury for which 
compensation and medical care is provided by this title 
that results in permanent incapacity which is 
substantially greater than he would have incurred if he 
had not had the pre-existing incapacity, compensation 
and medical care . . . shall be awarded.11 
U.C.A. 35-1-69 (Supp. 1974). The statute contemplates that the 
compensation and medical care for the preexisting impairment will 
be paid out of the Second Injury Fund. Chavez, v. Industrial 
Commission, 709 P,2d 1168, 1170 (Utah 1985); See Intermountain 
Health Care. Inc. v. Ortega, 562 P.2d 617 (Utah 1977). 
i 
U.C.A. 35-1-69 must be read in light of the other provisions 
of the statute. In Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P. 2d 954 
(Ct. App. 1988) the Utah Court of Appeals agreed with an ALJ of the 
Industrial Commission who found that the language of 35-1-67 
implies that there must be a causal connection between the 
industrial injury and the permanent total disability. Id. at 956. 
The Court of Appeals held that proof of a causal connection is 
required under Allen v. Industrial Commission Id. Therefore, the 
applicant "for permanent total disability benefits must prove 
medically that his disability was caused by an industrial 
accident." Jd. It is important to note that Large construes 
language in the statute that predates the 1988 amendment. 
Therefore, it appears that Large is controlling in this case and 
the applicant must show a causal connection between his industrial 
accident and his permanent total disability in order to receive 
benefits. 
The applicant asserts that Marshall v. Industrial Commission, 
704 P.2d 581 (Utah 1985) requires the Commission to apply the law 
as it existed at the time of the applicants injury. Marshall 
stands for the proposition that benefits to be awarded in workers7 
compensation cases are to be determined based on the statute as it 
existed at the time of injury. Although the applicant was injured 
in August 1975, he did not file his application for a hearing on 
permanent total disability until May 24, 1991. The relevant 
language in 35-1-67 was amended to require a showing of a causal 
connection in 1988. Thus, all case law construing the statute 
prior to 1988 should apply in the interpretation of the statute. 




between his industrial accident and his permanent disability. The 
applicant failed to show the requisite causal connection and, 
therefore, his request for permanent total disability was properly 
denied by the ALJ. 
3. DID THE ALJ IMPROPERLY FIND THAT THE INDUSTRIAL 
ACCIDENT WAS NOT THE MEDICAL CAUSE OF 
THE APPLICANT'S DISABILITY? 
The applicant attempted to show that the August 7, 1975 
industrial accident was the medical cause of his permanent total 
disability by showing that he never returned to work after the 
accident and that he was awarded social security disability 
benefits beginning on January 1, 1911. 
The social security decision to award benefits noted that the 
arthritis in the applicant's hands became much worse beginning in 
January 1977 and observed that the applicant's industrial injury 
most likely had minimal effect on the applicant's disability. The 
Social Security Administration (SSA) did not consider the applicant 
to be disabled until the arthritis in his hands and fingers became 
acute in 1977. Prior to that time, the vocational expert who 
testified at the SSA hearing indicated that there were jobs that 
the applicant could perform in 1978 had he not lost dexterity in 
his hands and fingers. Although the SSA hearing is not binding on 
the commission under the statute in effect at the time of the 
applicant's injury, it is relevant to determining the extent of the 
applicant's disability as well as its causal connection to the 
applicant's industrial injury. 
Examination of the applicant's medical records shows that he 
received no treatment for back pain or lumbar pain after 1976. 
Office notes of the doctors who treated the applicant immediately 
following the industrial accident regularly mention pain or limited 
use in many areas of the body, suggesting that the applicant was 
experiencing symptoms of progressive arthritis of the spine, 
shoulders,elbows and hands. Upon examination of the applicant in 
1976, Dr. MacArthur*concluded that the applicant's back pain was 
not so severe as to prevent him from working. In 1981, when the 
applicant was re-evaluated for SSA by Dr. Bench, the doctor 
concluded that the applicant's symptoms greatly exceeded his 
objective findings. Thus, the medical records do not establish a 
medical causal connection between the applicant's August 7, 1975 
industrial injury and his permanent total disability. 
4. SHOULD THE ALJ HAVE AWARDED THE APPLICANT A 
FIFTY PERCENT WHOLE PERSON IMPAIRMENT FOR THE 
PRE-EXISTING IMPAIRMENT IDENTIFIED BY THE 




Review of the applicant's Application for Hearing and the 
record, indicates that the applicant never requested consideration 
of a claim for permanent partial disability. Under 35-1-66 (Supp. 
1974), a claim for permanent partial disability benefits must be 
filed within 8 years of the date of injury. In the present case, 
the applicant filed his'application for hearing sixteen years after 
the injury. Therefore, the time for filing an application for 
permanent partial disability benefits had run when the applicant 
filed his application for permanent total disability benefits on 
May 24, 1991. 
5. DID THE ALJ FAIL TO DELINEATE ADEQUATE 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW? 
The applicant asserts that the Order fails to delineate 
adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the 
ALJ's Order in light of Adams v. Board of Review, 173 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 18 (1991) , indicates that the ALJ made findings sufficient to 
"disclose the steps by which the ultimate factual conclusions, or 
conclusions of mixed fact and law, are reached." Milne Truck 
Lines, Inc. v.- Public^ Service Comm'n, 720 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 
1979) cited in Adams, at 20. The ALJ's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are sufficient to show what issues were decided, 
legal interpretations and applications made, as well as the 
subsidiary factual findings which support her decision. See Adams 
at 21. Therefore, the commission finds that the ALJ's Order 
contains sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to 
support her decision to deny benefits to the applicant. 
6. WAS THE ALJ'S DECISION ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS? 
Review of the record indicates that there is substantial 
evidence to support the ALJ's findings. The applicant failed to 
delineate his specific objections in sufficient enough detail to 
allow the commission to address them. However, review of the 






IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative law judge 
dated March 18, 1992 is affirmed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah 
Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date hereof, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, and 63-46b-
16. The requesting party shall bear all costs to prepare a 
transcript of the hearing for appeals purposes. 
^MLM 
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